The 1972 miners' strike has duly been presented as decisive in shaping both Heath's demise and the eclipse of the post-1945 'consensus' between the main political parties, Conservative and Labour, and the social class interests -including capital and labour -that these parties are usually seen as approximately encompassing. 9 The miners' victory was achieved through mass picketing -and blockading -of power stations, like Longannet, and coal depots. This physical force encouraged the view that trade unions generally were undemocratic institutions that wielded power irresponsibly, threatening public order and economic 'stability'. Party. 10 Heath's approach -characterised as conciliating trade unions and protecting employment through public subsidy and inflationary growth -was abandoned. Unions were marginalised in the 1980s: their manufacturing and public sector strongholds were weakened through economic policies that accelerated structural economic change; their capacity to take effective industrial action was diminished by new laws on employment and industrial relations.
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So this article looks at a major event in Britain's contemporary history. The
Longannet blockade reveals much about the character of both the 1972 strike and industrial politics more generally in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s. In existing literature on each of these questions there is a tension between 'top down' accounts that privilege high politics, with developments engineered by government ministers and officials, 'peak level' business representatives and trade union executives, 12 and work that focuses on agency 'from below', with 'shop floor' or 'rank and file' pressure the predominant historical contingency. 13 This article examines the contextual importance of high politics, but gives greater weight popular agency. This is significant, because most 'top down' accounts of the strike emphasise the emergence in the late 1960s of 'militant' leadership on the NUM national executive, 'militant' usually used to distinguish communists and the first analysis of the strike to be based chiefly on unpublished government files. These papers perhaps confirm the interpretation in existing interpretations, that the government was determined to defeat the miners but complacent about the provision of electricity supplies during the dispute. But these papers also bring the distinctive perspective of this article very powerfully to the surface, namely the extent to which the strike was shaped not so much by miners' leaders but by the miners themselves.
High politics: the economic and industrial context of the 1972 strike
The 1972 strike was shaped by the NUM's politics, but these were conditioned less by personalities than the complex economic and social conditions and cultural traditions in the multi-faceted coalfields, which generated varying degrees of politicisation, and many species of political orientation, Feather observed that many miners would rather see the endangered pits close than continue being under-paid for a 'job which they and the public alike regarded as unpleasant and dangerous'.
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Against ministers' expectations, the NUM received crucial support from unionised transport workers on the roads and railways. 45 This meant that miners needed only token pickets to prevent coal from coming out of the collieries and by the second week of the strike were concentrating efforts on power stations. These proved to be central to the outcome of the dispute. 'It was on the gates of Longannet, Barking, Battersea and West Thurrock', wrote Malcolm Pitt, Kent miner, union activist and communist, 'that the battle of the miners was won.' 46 Here some elements of the Scottish experience are instructive.
At Longannet coal supplies were on site, so the pickets' first aim was to prevent coal getting out rather than in. Supplies were mainly earmarked for Cockenzie, the SSEB's second largest power station, east of Edinburgh, but members of the train drivers' union, ASLEF, cut these off, telling union officials that once the strike began that they would carry no coal from Longannet or anywhere else. This, it should be emphasised, reinforces the importance of rank-and-file agency in the dispute. Wilberforce's terms, constituting an additional £85 m 'to the bill for coal', with the final settlement that raised this to £116-117 m. The most significant addition was that the 'bonus' payment for the Saturday shift, paid since 1947 after the normal five-day working week, would now encompassed in the regular Monday to Friday shift rate. 77 Morgan's account was based on calculations published in The Economist, which linked the settlement to the observation that the 'moderate Mr Gormley now gives the impression of no longer being the man in charge'. 78 The NUM executive was, however, operating within considerable practical constraints, obliged to search for terms that their members would accept. Daly told
Heath that accepting Wilberforce would result in 50 per cent of the miners remaining on unofficial strike, and even the final settlement would not avert 'havoc in their ranks for a week or two', meaning a continuation of picketing and strikes 'in certain areas'. 79 While leisure pursuits: 'We don't WANT a Yacht. We Don't Ask a Lot. Just a Living Wage.' And the sporadic 'havoc' forecast by Daly duly materialised with a two-day unofficial strike at pits in West Lothian over the re-employment by the NCB of two men whose NUM membership had been withdrawn when they took other jobs during the strike. 80 These strikes followed the general relaxation of picketing on Monday 21 February, which allowed coal and oil to pass freely to power stations by road and rail. As Scotland's power generation approached pre-strike capacity, the Cabinet's Official Emergencies
Committee reported with satisfaction that Scotland was again exporting electricity to
England. 81 The miners resumed work on Monday 28 February, following a national ballot that ratified the Downing Street agreement by an overwhelming 210,039 votes to 7,581. representatives. 95 These economic processes were bolstered by less tangible social and all forms was crumbling as popular deference diminished and 'ordinary men and women' grew in confidence. This encouraged the taking of initiative on the shop floor, and loosened the ability of union executives to control or even to shape significantly the trajectory of industrial developments. 97 In the 1970s Conservative thinking and policy remained largely oblivious to these perspectives. Fred Lindop, for instance, has noted that the architects of the 1971
Industrial Relations Act, who included the Solicitor General, Geoffrey Howe, later
Thatcher's first Chancellor of the Exchequer, 'presumed that unions were (or should be) business organisations in which executives gave orders to subordinates'. 98 The legislation was subsequently discredited precisely because union members -particularly in the docks, on building sites and in engineering works -did not follow policies set down by union executives. Lindop, along with Darlington and Lyddon, has shown that the Act was challenged first by ordinary trade unionists, with union leaders compelled to assume positions of militant opposition to the legislation to retain influence within their organisations. 99 The realities of trade unionism -with shop floor pressure from below shaping union policy -continued to escape even thoughtful Conservatives. On the eve of the 'winter of discontent' of 1978-79, Peregrine Worsthorne, the Sunday Telegraph columnist 'who spoke for an important segment of Thatcherite High Tories', 100 speculated on why so many people in Britain -more, he claimed, than in other countries -owed their major or principal loyalty to a trade union. Worsthorne believed that the main explanation was Britain's 'spectacular loss of national prestige' over the course of the twentieth century. This was an inversion of the usual conservative assumption about the causal relationship between national decline and trade union power, with the former, he suggested, giving rise to the latter. 101 For the poor and the weak, Worsthorne argued, a union filled the vacuum once filled by an impressive imperial nation state. The same hierarchies and loyalties were allegedly evident:
Asked by a trade union leader to lay siege to a hospital, even decent members will suspend the inhibitions of conscience in exactly the same way as they would have done in the old days for some comparably ruthless act in the service of the nation. The same thoughtless, amoral jingoism which used to inspire a nation at war can now be found on the militant picket lines of an embattled union.
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In the 1972 strike, however, picketing and other strike activities were generally not directed from above in this manner. Rank and file agency was such, indeed, that the influence on events of miners' leaders, whether 'sensible moderates' or militant 'destroyers', 103 was highly constrained, as this account of the conduct and outcome of the strike has indicated. Hurd -and the historians who have followed him -have blown an undoubtedly important industrial and social problem into a major political and even near-revolutionary crisis. In this article the focus has been on the strike as a fairly straightforward industrial dispute that was pursued determinedly by the miners themselves, to arrest the decline in their real wages and to provide some compensation for employment insecurity in an industry experiencing structural decline and contraction. injury by a police boot. Authority was certainly questioned and even, to an extent, challenged at Longannet. But it was not seriously jeopardised.
Conclusion
The miners' strike duly suggests that the balance of power between capital and labour that had existed in Britain since the Second World War was still, just, present in the early 1970s. The term 'consensus' is usually used to describe this power balance, assumes an unambiguously anti-working class character: its thrust was at the manual working class and not just the excoriated union leaders.
